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Arkansas. Bosson v. Woman's Christian National Library
Ass'n' was an action in equify for specific performance of a land
contract. Bosson refused the conveyance on the ground that plain-
tiff could not convey good title because he was a charitable trustee
and had no power to sell the lots in question. The question pre-
sented was whether a charitable trustee may convey marketable
title to property held in trust for the purpose of erecting a public
library building thereon, apply money received from such convey-
ance to erect a building on county land, and turn the building
over to a permanent tax-supported library organization. The court
found that the land was no longer suitable for a library building;
that if one was built, it could not be supported out of the trust;
that the county owned land which was suitable for a library and
could be supported out of tax funds but had no money to erect
a building.
The court, in holding that the trustee could convey good title,
applied the cy pres doctrine. There was no express provision
against selling in the trust instrument, nor were there words giving
the trustees power to sell. The court said that the trustors could
not foresee that the land would become unsuitable for a library
building and that libraries would be maintained by public taxa-
tion. The court held that the trustee could convey good title in
order to carry out as nearly as possible, under the cy pres doc-
trine, the intent of the trustors. A correct application of the doc-
trine seems presented in the case. The doctrine will be applied to
a charitable trust if the purpose of the trust cannot be carried
out; then the equity court will allow it to be carried out in a
manner approaching as nearly as possible the original purpose.2
However, the Arkansas court has limited the application of the
I- Ark.-, 225 S. W. 2d. 336 (1949).
2 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEERS (1935) § 431;SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS (1939)
399.
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doctrine to trust instruments which have no express provision
against sale; if there is an express provision against the sale of
the land, the court will refuse to apply the doctrine.8 This is con-
trary to the Restatement view.4 Usually the courts will permit the
charitable trust to fail if there is a narrow, specific charitable
intent; the cy pres doctrine will be applied only if there is a gen-
eral charitable intent.' In the present case the Arkansas court
indicated that it would not apply the doctrine if there was a
specific provision against sale by the trustee, since it would nega-
tive a general charitable intent.
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS-BREACH OF AGENT'S DUTY OF LOYALTY
New Mexico. The Supreme Court of New Mexico in Mitchell v.
Allison' held that an agent (real estate broker) who breaches his
duty of loyalty in the buying of land holds the land on con-
structive trust for his principal. Defendant Allison was a real
estate broker and had approached the plaintiff concerning certain
land owned by a party in California. Plaintiff agreed that the
broker should purchase the land for him and receive the regular
commission. At the same time the defendant was also the agent
of the party in California to sell the land, and this was not dis-
closed. Defendant proceeded to buy the land and put it in the
name of his partner, and the defendant, on being approached by
the plaintiff to carry out his agreement, said that he would convey
the land less the mineral rights for three dollars an acre, which
was the agreed price for the land in toto. Plaintiff then brought
this action for damages. Apparently the land had been conveyed
so that the plaintiff could not compel a conveyance from de-
fendant. The court held that a broker who bought for himself was
a constructive trustee even if he did it in the name of a partner
and that it was no defense that the land could not be bought for
3 225 S. W. 2d. at 339. See Atkinson v. Lyle, 191 Ark. 61, 85 S. W. 2d. 715 (1935).
4 2 RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 381.
82 BOCRET. TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 436.
6- N. M.- 213 P. 2d. 231 (1949).
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the price of three dollars agreed on. The broker must notify his
principal of the larger price and give him the opportunity to pur-
chase at the higher price. This case is in accord with the ma-
jority and better view.7 The courts so holding say that there has
been a breach of a fiduciary or confidential duty and that in
equity and good conscience the agent should not be allowed to
keep the land.' The parol agreement to create the agency is not
within the Statute of Frauds, for there has been no agreement that
the agent is to convey an interest in land to his principal but
rather that he is to act merely as an intermediary and is to pro-
cure the land for a conveyance to his principal.9 The other line of
cases hold that the parol agreement between the agent and the
principal is essentially an agreement for the conveyance of an
interest in land and as such is directly in the teeth of the Statute
of Frauds. 0 The view taken in the principal case seems to be pre-
ferable,
RESULTING TRUST-ABSOLUTE CONVEYANCE FOR BENEFIT
OF GRANTORS
Oklahoma. In Johnson v. Johnson," a recent Oklahoma Su-
preme Court case, the question was whether or not a resulting
trust in land had been created. Defendant was the son of the
plaintiffs, and it appeared that he had urged them to convey land
to him in order to avoid the necessity for probate of their wills.
Plaintiffs did as the son asked. Defendant received one-half of the
land, and the 6ther one-half was conveyed to the daughter, later
being conveyed to her brother, the defendant. It was agreed at the
time of the conveyance that defendant was to hold the land, that
he would allow the plaintiffs all rights in the land during their
lifetime, and that he would convey the land to anyone they de-
7 BoCFnT. TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935 § 487; 3 ScoTT, THE LAW oF TRUSTS
(1939) 9 495.
s Ibid.
9 Ibid; 3 ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS (1939) § 402.
10 Ibid.
------Okla.-, 205 P. 2d. 314 (1949).
[Vol. 4
.1950] SURVEY OF SOUTHWESTERN LAW FOR 1949 355
sired. The evidence was that defendant had been paying rent to
the plaintiffs. The question in the case was who was entitled to
some twenty-five hundred dollars that was obtained for a lease
of the land. The court concluded that defendant held on resulting
trust for the plaintiffs. The trust did not come within the Statute
of Frauds because it arose by operation of law. However, the
court refused to cancel the deeds on the ground that the promise
to reconvey was within the Statute of Frauds. The court left the
deeds effective subject to the resulting trust as to possession, rents
and profits during the lifetime of the plaintiffs or the survivor of
them.
A resulting trust arises by operation of law; that is, from the
facts proved it is presumed that the parties intended that one
should hold on trust for the other even though there was no express
trust agreement between the parties.12 The most common example
of a resulting trust is where one party pays the purchase price and
the title is conveyed to another.18 In the instant case the title was
conveyed for no consideration to an immediate member of the
family, and it would seem from this if any presumption or infer-
ence be present, it would be one of gift to the son and daughter.
The better reasoning to reach the court's result would seem to be
that the son held on constructive trust because there was a confi-
dential, blood relationship, the conveyance was induced because
of the relationship, and the son would otherwise be unjustly en-
riched by his own wrong. If the reasoning of the instant case is
followed to its logical conclusion, many gifts between persons hav-
ing close blood ties would be subject to claims of resulting trusts.
However, Oklahoma courts have consistently followed the reason-
ing in the principal case; that is, where there is an absolute con-
veyance and an oral agreement between grantor and grantee, the
latter is said to hold on resulting trust for the grantor."4





CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST-BREACH OF VOLUNTARY AGENCY
RELATIONSHIP
Oklahoma. In Raper v. Thorn15 plaintiff and defendant were
friends on farms close to each other. Land separating the two
farms was up for sale in a partition suit, and it was agreed between
the parties that defendant should purchase the land at the auction
and that he would then convey the forty acres to the plaintiff, who
would pay him the purchase price. The defendant went to the sale,
bought in the land, and conveyed it to his son, not a bona fide pur-
chaser for value. The Oklahoma court declared that defendant
held on constructive trust for the plaintiff and that he was bound
to convey. The court said that it was not necessary that defendant
be under any duty to purchase the land, or that he received any
compensation for his services, or that he would have been under
any liability if he had failed to act. When he purchased the land
as a voluntary agent, partner, or trustee for the plaintiff, he was
bound to carry out his oral agreement. On a refusal to perform
his promise, the court will declare him a constructive trustee for
the plaintiff."6 The decision is consistent with the accepted theory
of constructive trusts. There was a confidential relationship and
the creation of a voluntary agency out of the relationship. When an
agent or fiduciary takes advantage of his position to enrich him-
self, the courts will not let him enjoy the fruits of his misconduct
but will compel him to hold the property as a constructive trustee
for the wronged party. 7 The result appears sound although there
was voluntary agency with no monetary reward for the agent.
Edward R. Holland.
15 Okla. , 211 P. 2d. 1007 (1949).
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